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ABSTRACT: The Recursive Bayesian Net (RBN) formalism was originally developed for modelling nested causal
relationships. In this paper we argue that the formalism can also be applied to modelling the hierarchical
structure of mechanisms. The resulting network contains quantitative information about probabilities, as
well as qualitative information about mechanistic structure and causal relations. Since information about
probabilities, mechanisms and causal relations is vital for prediction, explanation and control respectively, an
RBN can be applied to all these tasks. We show in particular how a simple two-level RBN can be used to
model a mechanism in cancer science. The higher level of our model contains variables at the clinical level,
while the lower level maps the structure of the cell’s mechanism for apoptosis.
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1. Introduction
This paper seeks to integrate considerations arising from recent philosophical work on
scientific explanation into the causal Bayesian network modelling formalism.
Bayesian networks were originally developed to model probabilistic and causal rela-
tionships (Pearl 1988). In the last two decades, Bayesian nets have become the model of
choice for prediction and control—for making quantitative predictions and for deciding
which variables to intervene on in order to control variables of interest. Thus a Bayesian
net can be used to answer questions such as: given that a patient has treatment t, what is the
probability P (r|t) that their cancer will recur in the next 5 years? And: on which variables should we
intervene in order to minimise the probability of recurrence? Causal information is important here
because it is only worth intervening on the causes of recurrence, not on other variables
which might be indicators of, or evidence of, recurrence.
The causal structure modelled by a Bayesian net can also help answer certain simple
explanatory questions, such as, what was the chain of events that led up to the recurrence of the
patient’s cancer? But often we want to be able to offer explanations, not in this backward,
ætiological sense, but in a downward, mechanistic sense. In order to answer how did
the patient’s cancer recur? we may need to specify the lower-level activities of the relevant
cancer mechanism and the corresponding cancer response mechanisms. To answer such
explanatory questions a model needs to represent the relevant mechanisms, including
their hierarchical organisation.
Philosophers of science have studied this kind of mechanistic explanation in some
detail in recent years. The current consensus is that a phenomenon is explained by
pointing out the constitution of reality—carved up in terms of parts, what the parts do,
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and the organisation of these parts—that is responsible for the phenomenon. These
lower-level phenomena may themselves call for explanation, in which case yet lower-
level phenomena will be invoked, and so on. This sort of explanation invokes inter-level
constitution and responsibility relations rather than intra-level causal relations. It is usually
downward-looking, but in some cases phenomena can be explained in upward-looking
mechanistic explanations (Darden 2006, 109).
The question therefore arises as to whether Bayesian nets—which are often used to
model intra-level causal relations—can be extended to model hierarchical mechanistic
structure, i.e., inter-level explanatory relations. If so, then Bayesian nets could be used
for mechanistic explanation as well as for prediction and control. They could also be
used for inter-level prediction and control, addressing questions such as, what components
of the (low-level) DNA damage response mechanism should one intervene on in order to increase the
probability of survival?
On the other hand, the question arises as to whether models of mechanisms, which,
in the biomedical science textbooks for instance, often take the form of elaborate
diagrams, and which depict qualitative structure very well, can be extended to include
quantitative, probabilistic information. This would allow one to use the model to answer
quantitative inter-level explanatory questions. E.g., why did Alfie survive 10 years rather than
the 1 year that was most probable given his (higher-level) clinical symptoms? Because his (lower-level)
DNA damage response mechanism had certain features that made longer survival much more probable.
That there is a need for a quantitative extension of mechanistic models is highlighted,
for instance, by cancer biologist Yuri Lazebnik:
Biologists summarize their results with the help of all-too-well recognizable diagrams, in which
a favorite protein is placed in the middle and connected to everything else with two-way arrows.
Even if a diagram makes overall sense, it is usually useless for a quantitative analysis, which limits
its predictive or investigative value to a very narrow range. (Lazebnik 2002, 181)
With the aim of addressing these two questions, this paper applies a hierarchical
extension of Bayesian nets to modelling hierarchical (inter-level) mechanistic structure
as well as causal (intra-level) relations and quantitative, probabilistic relations.
Bayesian nets have been extended to model hierarchy in a number of ways. For
example, recursive Bayesian multinetsmodel context-specific independence relationships and
decisions (Peña et al. 2002), recursive relational Bayesian networks model relational structure
and more complex dependence relationships (Jaeger 2001), object-oriented Bayesian networks
can simplify the structure of large and complex Bayesian nets (Koller and Pfeffer 1997),
hierarchical Bayesian networks offer a very general means of modelling arbitrary lower-level
structure (Gyftodimos and Flach 2002) and recursive Bayesian networks were developed
to model nested causal relationships (Williamson and Gabbay 2005). In this paper we
shall see how recursive Bayesian networks can also be used to model mechanisms, thus
providing an integrated modelling formalism for prediction, explanation and control.
This is important from the philosophy of science perspective of seeking to understand
modelling and its relation to goals of science such as prediction, explanation and control.
It is also important from the AI perspective of needing to provide models that can be
used to answer a variety of queries in decision support systems. And it is important
from the bioinformatics perspective, which requires models that can integrate a variety
Theoria 70 (2011): 5-33
Models for Prediction, Explanation and Control: Recursive Bayesian Networks 7
of data sources at different levels (e.g., clinical data and genomic data) with qualitative
knowledge of the basic science involved.
In the remainder of this section we will introduce the notion of mechanistic expla-
nation to which we appeal, the Bayesian net modelling formalism, and a cancer-science
case study that we will use as our running example. Then, in §2 we explain the recursive
Bayesian network formalism and show how it can be used to model mechanisms. In
§3 we show how such a network can be applied to the cancer science example. In §4
we argue that the recursive Bayesian network formalism really does model mechanisms
in the sense invoked by the recent philosophy of science literature. In §5 we compare
the formalism advocated here with other kinds of formalisms that might be applied to
prediction, explanation and control. We summarise and outline future research in §6.
It should be emphasised that in this paper we assume full knowledge of causal, prob-
abilistic and mechanistic relationships with the aim of showing that recursive Bayesian
networks offer a useful way of representing and reasoning with that knowledge. While
the assumption of full knowledge is rather strong, it allows us to set aside certain tech-
nical questions to do with partial information; for example, causal Bayesian nets depend
on the Causal Markov Condition (see below) and when common causes of measured
variables are not themselves measured, this assumption becomes implausible. We leave
the questions of how best to cope with partial knowledge, and of how to use recursive
Bayesian networks in an exploratory way to discover causal, probabilistic andmechanistic
relationships to future work; these questions will not be addressed in this paper.
Mechanistic explanation. Mechanistic explanation is an alternative to traditional
approaches to explanation such as the deductive-nomological (DN) model. It is far
more suited to the biomedical sciences, where there are few if any exceptionless laws,
and where scientists see themselves as instead involved in discoveringmechanisms. In the
last decade there has been a great deal of philosophical debate about what a mechanism
is, with three main contenders. Machamer, Darden and Craver have the dominant view:
‘Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular
changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions’ (Machamer et al.
2000, 3). Stuart Glennan holds: ‘A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that
produces that behavior by the interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions
between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations’
(Glennan 2002, S344). Bechtel and Abrahamsen’s view is: ‘A mechanism is a structure
performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component operations, and
their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for
one or more phenomena.’ (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, 423). These detailed debates
are interesting, but there is also clearly some consensus. The main contenders agree
that much explanation in the biomedical sciences proceeds by finding the mechanism
responsible for the phenomenon, and they all agree that finding a mechanism involves
finding parts, what the parts do, and their organization.Mechanistic explanation is usually
thought of as hierarchical rather than causal: the parts sought are those that constitute the
phenomenon of interest.
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Bayesian nets. A Bayesian net (BN) consists of a finite set V = {V1, . . . , Vn} of
variables, each of which takes finitely many possible values, together with a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) whose nodes are the variables in V , and the probability distribution
P (Vi|Par i) of each variable Vi conditional on its parents Par i in the DAG. Figure 1
gives an example of a directed acyclic graph; to form a Bayesian net, the probability
distributions P (V1), P (V2|V1), P (V3|V2), P (V4|V2V3) and P (V5|V3) need to be pro-
vided. The graph and the probability function are linked by the Markov Condition which
says that each variable is probabilistically independent of its non-descendants, condi-
tional on its parents, written Vi ⊥ ND i | Par i. Figure 1 implies for instance that V4 is
independent of V1 and V5 conditional on V2 and V3. A Bayesian net determines a joint
probability distribution over its nodes via P (v1 · · · vn) =
￿n
i=1 P (vi|par i) where vi is
an assignment Vi = x of value x to Vi and par i is the assignment of values to its parents
induced by the assignment v = v1 · · · vn. In a causally-interpreted Bayesian net or causal
net , the arrows in the DAG are interpreted as direct causal relationships (Williamson
2005), and the net can be used to infer the effects of interventions as well as to make
probabilistic predictions (Pearl 2000); in this case the Markov Condition is called the
Causal Markov Condition.
✒✑✓✏V1 ✲✒✑✓✏V2 ❍❍❍❍❍❥
✲✒✑✓✏V4
✒✑✓✏V3 ✟✟
✟✟
✟✯
✲✒✑✓✏V5
Figure 1: A directed acyclic graph
Cancer case study. The applicability of RBNs will be illustrated with reference to
cancer science. Cancer is a complex biological and social phenomenon, initiated by
exposure to DNA-damaging factors and leading, through a succession of steps, to ‘un-
regulated cell growth’ (King 2000, 1). At the molecular level of description, causal factors
triggering cancer are commonly divided into those that are external to the individual
(e.g., UV, ionising radiation, chemicals) and those that are internal (e.g., free radical for-
mation, incomplete repair of misaligned bases).1 These factors, in turn, are related to
high-level variables such as lifestyle (e.g., dietary habits, smoking habits, exposure to so-
lar radiation), family history, age, clinical evidence (e.g., biopsy results, X-rays), survival,
etc. The bearing of these high-level variables on the molecular variables is still not well
understood. What we know, however, is that internal and external factors both exercise
their harmful potential by damaging DNA and that, in turn, the cell’s ability to respond
to DNA damage, whether unaided (before cancer development), or aided by treatments
(when cancer, after development, is being cured), influences the organism’s survival via
regulating cell growth.
1 King (2000, 24) uses the terms ‘exogenous’ and ‘endogenous’ factors, respectively. In order to avoid
confusion with the technical meaning those terms have in statistical modelling, we use the more
intuitive terms ‘external’ and ‘internal’.
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In §3 we will present a two-level RBN comprising, at the higher level, simple
variables—age, familial factors and survival—and a recursive variable, DNA condition, the
latter being analysed at the lower level in terms of one mechanism for DNA damage
response, apoptosis, i.e., cell suicide, and the role of the protein p53 within this mech-
anism. This can provide a valuable insight into the relationships between higher-level
variables, on the one hand, and molecular indicators of correct or incorrect functioning
of apoptosis, on the other.
2. Recursive Bayesian nets
Recursive Bayesian networks (RBNs) were originally developed in Williamson and Gab-
bay (2005) to model nested causal relationships such as [smoking causing cancer] causes tobacco
advertising restrictions which prevent smoking which is a cause of cancer. But nested causality is not
a general concern of this paper; in this section we develop the RBN formalism in the
context of modelling mechanisms rather than nested causality.2
Definitions. A recursive Bayesian net is a Bayesian net defined over a finite set V of
variables whose values may themselves be RBNs. A variable is called a network variable if one
of its possible values is an RBN and a simple variable otherwise. Note that an RBN is a
Bayesian net—a Bayesian net whose variables may be richly structured. On the other
hand, Bayesian nets are also RBNs: a simple Bayesian net is an RBN whose variables are
all simple.
The directed acyclic graph of an RBNA is the top level ofA. A DAG of another RBN
that is the value of a network variable Vi ofA is the next level down inA, and so on; Vi is the
direct superior of the variables in that DAG, and those variables are its direct inferiors. Vari-
ables that occur at the same level of an RBN are said to be peers. If an RBN contains no
infinite descending chains—i.e., if each descending chain of inferiors terminates in a sim-
ple variable—then it is well-founded . We restrict our attention to well-founded RBNs here.
Example. To take a very simple example, consider an RBN on V = {M,S}, where
M stands for some DNA damage response mechanism which takes two possible values, 0
and 1, while S is survival after 5 years which takes two possible values yes and no. The
corresponding Bayesian net is:
✒✑✓✏M ✲✒✑✓✏S
P (M), P (S|M)
2 A mechanism can be thought of as a special case of nested causality: one in which causal relations are
nested according to the levels of organisation of the mechanism. While in the general case of nested
causality the same variable can appear at more than one level (e.g., smoking and cancer in the above
example), this is rarely if ever plausible within the specific context of a mechanism, where different
levels tend to mention different variables because each level of a mechanism is taken to constitute a
higher-level phenomenon to be explained as well as to explain it. This fact makes the question of the
consistency of a RBN (Williamson and Gabbay 2005, §4) somewhat easier to analyse in our context.
(On the other hand, should mechanisms be found that do exhibit causation across levels, then it is
possible to use repeated variables in the RBN formalism to represent such phenomena.)
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Suppose that S is a simple variable but that M is a network variable, with each of
its two values denoting a lower-level (simple) Bayesian network that represents a state
of the DNA damage response mechanism. When M is assigned value 1 we have a
net m1 representing a functioning damage response mechanism, with a probabilistic
dependence (and a causal connection) between damage D and response R:
✒✑✓✏D ✲✒✑✓✏R
Pm1(D), Pm1(R|D)
On the other hand, when M is assigned value 0 we have a net m0 representing a
malfunction of the damage response mechanism, with no dependence (and no causal
connection) between damage D and response R:
✒✑✓✏D ✒✑✓✏R
Pm0(D), Pm0(R)
Since these two lower-level nets are simple Bayesian nets the RBN is well-founded and
fully described by the three nets.
Modelling assumptions. Since an RBN is defined as a special kind of Bayesian net,
the Markov Condition is imposed on any set of peers. In fact, since we are concerned
here with modelling mechanisms under complete causal knowledge, we shall assume in
this paper that each arrow is interpreted causally—though this causal interpretation is
not essential to the general RBN formalism—and that the Causal Markov Condition
holds of any set of peers.3 The Causal Markov Condition describes the causally-induced
probabilistic independencies that obtain at any particular level of the RBN. But RBNs
are subject to a further condition, the Recursive Markov Condition, which describes inter-
level independencies and which says that each variable is probabilistically independent of
those variables that are neither its inferiors nor peers, conditional on its direct superiors.
Combining the intra-level independencies posited by the Causal Markov Condition and
the inter-level independencies of the Recursive Markov Condition we have a further
condition, which we take as the key condition to be satisfied by an RBN:
3 Note that the Causal Markov Condition is somewhat controversial (see, e.g., Cartwright 2007, Part II).
In particular, its validity depends on the way in which causality itself is analysed (Williamson 2005,
Chapter 4). For the purposes of this paper, we need neither pin down a specific analysis of causality
nor precisely delimit the validity of the Causal Markov Condition: it is simply taken to be a modelling
assumption that is open to question and to testing. See (Spirtes et al. 1993, §5.5) for discussion of
statistical tests for probabilistic independence.
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Recursive Causal Markov Condition (RCMC). Each variable in the RBN is inde-
pendent of those variables that are neither its effects (i.e., descendants) nor its
inferiors, conditional on its direct causes (i.e., parents) and its direct superiors:
Vi ⊥ NID i | DSupi ∪ Par i for each variable Vi, where NID i is the set of
non-inferiors-or-descendants of Vi andDSupi is the set of direct superiors of Vi.
Joint distribution. We shall now turn to the question as to how one might exploit the
modelling assumption RCMC to define a joint probability distribution over the variables
that occur as the various levels of the network. LetV = {V1, . . . , Vm} (m≥n) be the set
of variables of an RBN closed under the inferiority relation: i.e., V contains the variables
in V , their direct inferiors, their direct inferiors, and so on. LetN = {Vj1 , . . . , Vjk} ⊆ V
be the network variables in V . For each assignment n = vj1 , . . . , vjk of values to the
network variables we can construct a simple Bayesian net, the flattening of the RBN
with respect to n, denoted by n↓, by taking as nodes the simple variables in V plus
the assignments vj1 , . . . , vjk to the network variables,4 and including an arrow from
one variable to another if the former is a parent or direct superior of the latter in
the original RBN. The conditional probability distributions are constrained by those in
the original RBN: P (Vi|Par i ∪ DSupi) must be consistent with the Pvjl (Vi|Par i)
given in the RBN for each direct superior Vjl of Vi. If each variable has at most one
direct superior in the RBN then this will uniquely determine the required distribution
P (Vi|Par i ∪DSupi); in other cases we follow Williamson and Gabbay (2005, §5) and
take the distribution to be that, from all those that satisfy the constraints, which has
maximum entropy. The Markov Condition holds in the flattening because the Recursive
Causal Markov Condition holds in the RBN.
Of course in the flattening the arrows are not all interpretable causally so the Causal
Markov Condition is not satisfied. The non-causal arrows (the arrows from the direct
superiors of a variable to the variable itself) are not to be interpreted as giving the direction
of explanation either—they signify the direct superiority relation. The flattening should
be thought of as a formal tool for defining a joint distribution, rather than a part of the
RBN model itself, so the fact that the arrows in the flattening do not admit a uniform
interpretation is neither here nor there: the arrows are a formal device for representing
probabilistic independencies via the Markov Condition. (For the flattening to satisfy the
Markov Condition, the extra arrows have to be directed from direct superior to direct
inferior; the opposite orientation will not work as it will imply different independence
relationships which are not all supported by the Recursive Causal Markov Condition.)
In our example, for assignmentm0 of network variableM we have the flatteningm↓0:
✒✑✓✏m0 ✲
❄
❍❍❍❍❍❥
✒✑✓✏S
✒✑✓✏D ✒✑✓✏R
4 These can be thought of as variables that can only take one possible value, i.e., constants. In the Bayesian
net literature they are called instantiations of the corresponding variables Vj1 , . . . , Vjk .
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with probability distributions P (m0) = 1, P (S|m0) determined by the top level of the
RBN and with P (r1|m0) = Pm0(r1) and similarly for r0, d0 and d1. The flattening
with respect to assignmentm1 is:
✒✑✓✏m1 ✲
❄
❍❍❍❍❍❥
✒✑✓✏S
✒✑✓✏D ✲✒✑✓✏R
Again P (r1|d1m1) = Pm1(r1|d1) etc. In each case the required conditional distribu-
tions are fully determined by the distributions given in the original RBN.
As long as certain consistency requirements are satisfied (Williamson and Gabbay
2005, §4), the flattenings suffice to determine a joint probability distribution over the
variables in V via P (v1 · · · vm) =
￿m
i=1 P (vi|par idsupi) where the probabilities on
the right-hand side are determined by a flattening induced by v1 · · · vm.
Prediction, explanation and control. With a joint distribution, the RBN determines
the probabilities of all combinations of assignments of values to variables, so the model
can be used for prediction. For example, the probability that R has value 1 and that the
patient will survive 5 years is
P (s1r1) = P (m0s1r1) + P (m1s1r1) = P (s1|m0)P (m0)Pm0(r1)+
+ P (s1|m1)P (m1) (Pm1(r1|d1)Pm1(d1) + Pm1(r1|d0)Pm1(d0))
and these latter probabilities are all given in the RBN.
More than that, since at each level the arrows in the RBN are interpreted causally,
the model can be used for backwards ætiological explanation: one might cite damage
response mechanism type 1 as the reason a patient survived 5 years. If the inter-
level relations match that of mechanistic composition then the model can be used for
mechanistic explanation. Thus the values of the damage and response variables and the
link between the two might explain survival.
Finally one can use an RBN to reason about control across levels: by intervening on
response R one might change the probability of survival. Interventions in RBNs work
in just the same way as they do in standard Bayesian nets. When one intervenes to fix
the value of a variable, one creates a new net by deleting all the arrows that go into that
variable in the RBN. Then one calculates probabilities in the usual way, instantiating the
variable in question to the appropriate value, and using flattenings if necessary. Thus in
our example, intervening to set R to value r1 involves no change at the top level, but
both lower-level graphs now have no arrow from D to R:
✒✑✓✏D ✒✑✓✏R
Both flattenings then have the same graphical structure:
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✒✑✓✏mi ✲
❄
❍❍❍❍❍❥
✒✑✓✏S
✒✑✓✏D ✒✑✓✏R
and the newprobability of s1 after intervention to set r1,5 isP (s1||r1) = P (s1r1)/P (r1),
with these last probabilities calculated using the new network structure:
P (s1r1) = P (m0s1r1) + P (m1s1r1) =
= P (s1|m0)P (m0)Pm0(r1) + P (s1|m1)P (m1)Pm1(r1),
and
P (r1) = P (m0)Pm0(r1) + P (m1)Pm1(r1).
While the formal apparatus for handling interventions in RBNs is exactly the same
as that for standard Bayesian nets, one needs to be careful now that the level at which
the intervention takes place has been correctly identified. Thus while it may be possible
to intervene at the lower level to set R to value r1, presumably what one wants to do in
this case is not to initiate damage response (e.g., cell suicide) in all cells, healthy included.
Rather, one wants to intervene to ensure that the response is triggered by damage, i.e.,
one wants to ensure that D does cause R. This is an intervention to fix the value ofM
tom1, rather than to fix the value of R to r1—it is a higher-level intervention.
Note that it is quite common in themechanisms literature to distinguish interventions
at different levels, even when those levels are related by constitutive relations—e.g., in
discussions ofmutualmanipulability of different levels of amechanism (see §4.). SoRBNs
are not adding anything conceptually here. Also, the formal treatment of interventions
that RBNs appeal to is just the formal treatment in ordinary Bayesian nets, so RBNs
do not add anything in terms of formal explication. What RBNs do, is allow one to
apply the latter formal account of what interventions entail (in terms of the probabilistic
inferences one can draw on the basis of interventions) to the former case of multi-level
interventions. This is something new and not handled by standard Bayesian nets.
3. Cancer application
In this section the applicability of RBNs to cancer science is illustrated in more detail.
We will present a more realistic two-level RBN, comprising a higher, clinical level and
a lower, molecular level. At the clinical level (see Figure 2), familial (i.e., hereditary)
factors of a certain type of cancer (F ) and age (A) cause DNA condition (C), which
in turn causes survival in months (S), with A having also a residual influence on S
that doesn’t go through C . F , A and S are simple variables. C , instead, is a network
5 A conditional probability where the condition is an intervention is often represented using a double bar,
P (·||·).
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✒✑✓✏A ❍❍❍❍❍❥
③✒✑✓✏C ✲✒✑✓✏S
✒✑✓✏F ✟✟
✟✟
✟✯
Figure 2: F : Familial Factors; A: Age; C : DNA Condition; S: Survival.
✒✑✓✏D✟✟✟✟✟✙ ❄
③✒✑✓✏G ✲✒✑✓✏P ✲❍❍❍❍❍❥✒✑
✓✏
O ✲✒✑✓✏E
✒✑✓✏T ✲✒✑✓✏I
✻
✟✟
✟✟
✟✯
Figure 3: Functioning apoptosis mechanism. D: Damaging agents; G: p53 gene status;
P : p53 protein level; O: Apaf1 level; E: caspase 3 level; T : TNF level; I : caspase 8 level.
variable whose two values, c1 (good) and c0 (bad), correspond to lower-level networks
(Figure 3 and Figure 4) representing themechanism for apoptosis functioning, respectively,
correctly or incorrectly.6 Let us introduce these lower-level networks whilst describing
the mechanism.7
DNA damage is responsible (i) for disrupting the cell’s regulatory activities, that is,
the cell’s ability to transcribe genes that the affected DNA encodes; and (ii) for modifying
the survival ability of the daughter cells, due to the harmful genomic mutations which
obtain as the damage is passed from mother cell to daughter cell when the mother cell
undergoes mitosis, i.e., cell division. When the DNA is damaged, a well-functioning cell
reacts via defence mechanisms known as “DNA repair” mechanisms that heal the cell
after damage has arrested its cycle. Depending on the kind of damage (e.g., single-strand,
double-strand, mismatch), different enzymes are recruited to fix the damage. As a last
resort, if the damage is serious and cannot be effectively repaired, the cell either (i) enters
an irreversible state of dormancy (“senescence”) or (ii) commits suicide (“apoptosis”).
6 At the higher level, the amount of DNA carried by the cell constitutes evidence for apoptosis functioning
correctly or incorrectly—in case of malfunctioning of apoptosis the cell’s DNA can grow up to 4-5
times larger.
7 If one were to draw the flattenings c↓1 and c
↓
0 that contain the lower-level networks represented in figure
3 and figure 4 respectively, one would also need to include nodes for the assignments c1 and c0 of the
network variableC and arrows from them to their inferiorsD,G, P,O,E, T and I in each flattening.
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✒✑✓✏D✟✟✟✟✟✙ ❄
③✒✑✓✏G ✲✒✑✓✏P ❍❍❍❍❍❥✒✑
✓✏
O ✲✒✑✓✏E
✒✑✓✏T ✲✒✑✓✏I
✻
✟✟
✟✟
✟✯
Figure 4: Malfunctioning apoptosis mechanism.D: Damaging agents;G: p53 gene status;
P : p53 protein level; O: Apaf1 level; E: caspase 3 level; T : TNF level; I : caspase 8 level.
However, when none of the above strategies is effective, damaged cells keep growing
and dividing and, in so doing, produce mutations, which are the first step toward cancer
development.
This is, in short, how errors accumulate irreversibly, from one mitosis to another.
During DNA replication, misreading of damaged bases can occur, leading to incorpo-
ration of wrong bases opposite damaged ones (e.g., an A:T nucleotide base pair is in the
daughter cell’s DNA where the mother cell’s DNA had a G:C nucleotide base pair, due
to a G→ A mutation). When the cell undergoes division, DNA changes in the mother
cell result in mutations, that is, irreversible changes in DNA sequence, in the daughter cell.
Inherited changes, in fact, cannot be repaired, as they are on both strands of DNA, so
template information for correction is lost. As a consequence, they are replicated and
inherited through further divisions.
Notice that, although DNA replication mechanisms are very precise, DNA damage
due to both internal and external factors can produce a daily number of lesions high
enough to be dangerous (King 2000, 125). This is why the mechanisms that allow the
cell to correct errors before they are replicated (repair) or prevent mutations (senescence
and apoptosis) are so important. In fact, a mutation can start a cascade of mutations,
because of its capacity to impair the cell’s activities (among which there is the production
of enzymes needed in DNA repair itself), so that further mutations occur more easily.
What follows is a summary of the mechanism upon which the cell relies in order to
oppose cancer development.8 Possible indicators of good or bad functioning of these
mechanisms will also be introduced in order to devise the lower-level decomposition of
the network variable C .
Although there are ways of measuring DNA damage in vitro, there currently is no
way to determine this directly in vivo. One needs to resort to the expression levels of
certain DNA damage response genes as a surrogate for DNA damage; among these
genes, p53 is considered the “master guardian” of genomic integrity of the cell. After
noticing presence of metabolic disorder or genetic damage, protein p53 can induce
8 This summary develops discussion in Weinberg (2007, ch. 9) and we refer the reader to that text for a
more detailed description.
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cell-cycle arrest, activate DNA repair proteins, or lead to cell death (apoptosis).9 The
basic steps leading to cell-cycle arrest are p53’s induction of the synthesis of the protein
p21Cip1, which prevents cyclin dependent kinases (CDKs) from triggering the process
of growth-and-division. Halting the cell cycle, in turn, permits DNA polymerases and
other molecules to perform DNA repair. However, if the metabolic derangement or
genomic damage is too severe to be cured, p53 may decide—it is still unclear how—that
cell death is a better option. For reasons of brevity, only a simplified version of the
mechanisms responsible for apoptosis involving p53 will be presented here.
In a well-functioning cell, “wild” (i.e., non-mutant) p53 normally goes through a
rapid degradation, due to its being “tagged” by the Mdm2 protein and subsequently
“digested” by proteasomes. The amount of p53 increases when, e.g., its phosphorylation
due to genotoxic (i.e., DNA damaging) factors (e.g., X-rays), or the phosphorylation of
Mdm2 due to ATM kinase, results in Mdm2 being unable to bind to p53. Interestingly
enough, p53 promotes synthesis of Mdm2, thereby contributing to its own inhibition in
a negative feedback loop. This loop successfully regulates apoptosis unless the gene p53
mutates. In the latter case, mutation of p53 prevents Mdm2 from binding to p53 and, as
per the wild case, this results in an increase of p53. However, the defective p53 has lost
its ability to act as a transcription factor, that is, is unable to bind to the promoters of
genes that synthesise pro-apoptotic proteins in the successive stages of the mechanism.
According to available data, gene p53 is mutated in 30% to 50% of commonly
occurring human cancers (Weinberg 2007, 310). The crucial, causal, role of the protein
p53 is explicitly recognised, as is the possibility of building a mechanistic model around
p53 to explain how alarm signals stop the cell cycle or trigger apoptosis (Weinberg 2007,
316-317). The explanatory value of such a model and the added, predictive, advantage
of our RBN will be particularly relevant to cancer types where p53 is highly mutated.
When modelling, the Mdm2-p53 loop will be simplified so as to represent its overall
influence by a single arrow, since RBNs, like standard BNs, do not admit cycles (see
also §4). In the RBN, the upstream variables D (damaging agents) and G (p53 gene
status, which can be wild or mutant) initiate distinct pathways in the case of a healthy
cell and a cancerous cell. In both, an edge links D and G to P (p53 protein level).
In the network for the healthy cell, P is, in turn, directly linked to downstream effects of
the regulatory feedback loop p53-Mdm2. This latter link is missing in the network for the
cancerous cell. Both networks include, among the values of D, both radiotherapy and
chemotherapeutic agents (e.g., Cisplatin and the topoisomerase II inhibitors etopiside
and mitoxantrone), whose effects on apoptosis are being extensively investigated (see,
e.g., http://www.virtualtumour.co.uk/apoptosis.htm).
In thewell-functioning cell, increased p53 plays an important role in several apoptotic
signalling pathways. It is useful to distinguish between an intrinsic (internal to the cell) and
an extrinsic (external) pathway. The apoptotic signal can also be amplified via crosstalk
between these pathways.
9 Following the lead of the biological literature, we use the same name to refer to a gene and the protein
it codes for, and distinguish the former from the latter by italicising it (e.g., p53 stands for the gene,
p53 for the protein).
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Internally, p53 acts as transcription factor for the encoding of pro-apoptotic proteins
(e.g., Bax) that, by opening the mitochondrial membrane channel, allow release of
cytochrome c. Pro-apoptotic proteins belong, together with anti-apoptotic proteins, to
a family of proteins named the “Bcl-2 family” (after Bcl-2, the first protein found to
contribute to regulation of apoptosis besides p53), due to their sharing a common coding
sequence. Their balance determines the opening of the mitochondrial membrane and the
release of cytochrome c, that binds a protein called Apaf1 and leads to the formation of
a wheel-like heptamer called apoptosome. The apoptosome, then, recruits procaspase 9
and activates it bymeans of proteolytic cleavage, so that it becomes caspase 9 (“initiator”).
Caspase 9, in turn, initiates a cascade of caspases 3, 6 and 7 (“executioners”) that results
in the disintegration of the cell. Executioners can be inhibited by IAPs proteins—their
action, in turn, being inhibited by another protein, Smac/DIABLO, also released by
the mitochondrion together with cytochrome c. Level of apoptosis cannot be easily
measured. Expression levels of the caspases 3 and 9 are often used as surrogates.
Also in this case, it will be useful to bypass the intermediary steps of the cascade,
as the catalytic action of caspases amplifies the signal via a positive feedback loop. For
the sake of simplicity, our RBN will include an edge from P to O, which stands for the
effect of p53 on the production of Apaf1 in the healthy cell network, and no such link
in the cancerous cell network. Another edge will then depart from O to E to signify the
overall activation level of Caspase 3 due to the production and subsequent activation
of Apaf1 via the activation of Caspase 9.10 In both the healthy cell network and the
cancerous cell network a direct edge from D to E will stand for all damaging, residual,
effects on apoptosis that do not go through P .
Let us turn to the extrinsic pathway. This is due to ligands in the extracellular space
(e.g., FasL) belonging to the TNF (tumour necrosis factor) protein family, that bind
to death receptors on the surface of the cell (e.g., FasR). The tail of these receptors
act in conjunction with the FADD protein to assemble DISC, a complex which, by
prior activation of initiator caspases 8 and 10, triggers another cascade of caspases 3,
6 and 7. p53 contributes to this process by promoting the expression of the genes
encoding the Fas receptor, thereby increasing the cell’s responsiveness to extracellular
10 Notice that, although this is a simplified representation of the intrinsic apoptotic pathway, it is sufficiently
faithful to reality. As shown by recent studies on the role of Apaf1, XIAP, andCaspases 3 and 9 (Legewie
et al. 2006), Caspase 3 activity is bistable and irreversible. Simulations identify hysteretic behaviour,
with low active Caspase 3 depending on low active Apaf1 until a threshold point is reached where
active Caspase 3 switches irreversibly to a high state. Other simulations explain the role of XIAP in
establishing bistability and irreversibility. For low Apaf1, most Apaf1-associated active Caspase 9 is
inhibited by XIAP, whereas above the threshold Apaf1 manages to initiate Caspase 3 activation. Active
Casp3 then further promotes its own activation by sequestering XIAP away from Apaf1-associated
Caspase 9. This results in most of XIAP being bound to Caspase 3, and therefore being unable
to inhibit Caspase 9, which is then free to trigger executioner Caspase 3. Furthermore, Caspase 3
activity is maintained even if the stimulus is removed, since Caspase 3, once activated, retains XIAP,
thereby preventing full Caspase 9 deactivation. These conclusions are well supported by experimental
studies. This makes it plausible to model the influence of p53 on Caspase 3 in a linear fashion, with
P contributing to O, and O having a positive net effect on E, and to ignore the inhibiting activity of
XIAP.
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death ligands, specifically FasL. The extracellular apoptotic signal can be amplified by
crosstalk between the two pathways: caspases 8 and 10 cleave Bid, which inhibits the
action of Bcl-2 antiapoptotic proteins.
The extrinsic pathway in the RBN will be modelled as follows: an edge will be
included to represent the influence of T (TNF proteins) on I (activation level of Caspase
8), which, in turn, has an effect onE. Furthermore, an arrow fromP to I will be included
to represent the—indirect—effect of p53 on Caspase 8 activation via the expression of
genes encoding Fas. Finally, an edge from I to O will be added to model the inhibiting
effect of Caspase 8 on Bcl-2 antiapoptotic proteins through the activation of Bid. The
latter two edges provide a (simplified) representation of the crosstalk between intrinsic
and extrinsic pathways.11
Cancer cells inactivate apoptosis in several ways that enable them to survive and
thrive. They can increase the level of anti-apoptotic proteins, change the gene coding for
p53 or its upstream regulators, methylate promoters of pro-apoptotic genes, interfere
with the release of cytochrome c, inhibit caspases, etc. On the other hand, over-expression
of proapoptotic proteins or dysfunction of antiapoptotic proteins due to mutations can
result in too much apoptosis and cause other pathological conditions, e.g., neurodegen-
erative disorders such as Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s disease. Thus, an RBN could also
prove useful in explaining the relevance of p53 with regard to these latter diseases.
4. RBNs as models of mechanisms
We have described the formalism that allows recursive Bayesian nets to be extended to
model mechanistic hierarchy, and illustrated it by applying it to a DNA damage response
mechanism. In this section we address philosophical concerns about the interpretation
of RBNmodels. According to the recent mechanisms literature, mechanistic explanation
proceeds by identifyingmechanisms.Herewe argue that RBNs are legitimate descriptions
of such mechanisms: BNs, designed to model causal structures, can be extended in the
way we suggest to model mechanistic hierarchy. First, we will examine how well the
RBN framework can be used to capture the philosophical consensus on mechanisms. In
particular, we will illustrate how the network variables in an integrated model—which
are the variables that must fit both in a causal BN and in the mechanistic hierarchy—can
accommodate the relevant constraints. Then we will move on to examine the modelling
assumptions that RBNs need to satisfy. We conclude this section by discussing the
advantages of representing mechanisms in this way.
11 In this case the simplified representation of the extrinsic pathway in the RBN is also supported by
experimental evidence aided by computation. Among other studies, Mai and Liu (2009) have recently
produced a 40-node Boolean Network and performed extensive statistical analyses of its state space,
which has resulted in the identification of key network components responsible for the stability of
the surviving states and the irreversibility of the apoptotic process. Among other things, the study has
confirmed the role of TNF as a strong promoter of apoptosis, its effects being only partially offset by
GF (growth factor) once apoptosis has been initiated.
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Modelling mechanisms. It is natural to have philosophical concerns about integrat-
ing BNs and mechanisms. Causal BNs are designed to model causal relations between
distinct events, and are explicitly quantitative; the mechanisms literature concerns itself
instead with constitutive relations—with how a lower level makes up or composes a
higher level that it is not entirely distinct from—and is largely qualitative. We need to
explain how a single model can accommodate these differences.
The qualitative-quantitative difference is not a deep one. Attention has been given
to qualitative aspects of mechanisms in the philosophical literature on mechanisms
because the main worry has been interpretation—the question being what counts as
a mechanism and what doesn’t—rather than modelling. But there is no reason why
relations in mechanisms cannot be modelled quantitatively. The structure of this model is
another issue: can we represent causal and constitutive structure so readily in the same
model?
We will begin to address this question by explaining how RBNs can legitimately
be used to describe mechanisms as they are examined in the burgeoning mechanisms
literature.12 The complex-systems approach to mechanisms of Machamer, Darden and
Craver (MDC), Glennan, and Bechtel and Abrahamsen (B&A), that we have introduced
earlier in §1. is explicitly concerned with explanation. It offers an account of what mech-
anisms are as they are used in decompositional explanations of higher-level phenomena
in terms of the lower-level parts that constitute them. There are disagreements over
details within this literature, but a great deal of agreement over core elements vital to a
mechanistic explanation. These are:
• Decomposition into entities and activities (always)
• Organisation (always)
• Hierarchy (often)
The first element is that mechanisms have two kinds of parts: the objects in the
mechanism, and the things that the objects do. MDC, Glennan, and B&A use different
language for the two kinds of parts, but agree on this distinction. We useMDC’s language
but we use it merely descriptively as has become standard; there is no need to adopt
their controversial metaphysical claims of entity-activity dualism in this paper. Entities
and activities are not just any old division of a mechanism into pieces. The division must
be into functioning components—a mechanistic explanation must identify those entities
and activities by which the phenomenon is produced. Put simply, Craver’s account of
what it is forX to be part of the mechanism for Y is i)X is a part of Y and ii)X and Y
are mutually manipulable—wiggleX and Y wiggles, and vice versa. (For Craver’s more
formal statement of this, see Craver (2007, 152-153).)
12 There is controversy within that literature, of course. We will not address the views of Woodward, and of
Glymour and Cheng, on mechanisms (Woodward 2002, S375; Glymour and Cheng 1998). They hold
that mechanisms are chains of difference-making relations of the same kind as are already modelled
using BNs. Modelling mechanisms of this sort is done merely by adding extra nodes between existing
nodes of a simple BN. There is nothing distinctive about this kind of mechanism, nothing beyond the
BN approach. Modelling this kind of mechanism is no particular challenge because it does not add an
extra explanatory dimension to the structure already existing in a standard BN.
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The second element is that the entities and activities must be organized, spatially and
temporally, in order to produce the phenomenon. This element cannot be ignored. As
MDC, for example, write: ‘The organization of these entities and activities determines
the ways in which they produce the phenomenon’ (Machamer et al. 2000, 3). See also
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005, 435) and Darden (2002, S355).
The third element is that mechanistic decomposition is often hierarchical. The de-
composition often continues beyond the entities and activities that initially explain a
particular phenomenon, to look at the entities and activities that in turn explain one or
more of the newly-identified activities, and so on. As Machamer et al. (2000, 13) write:
‘Mechanisms occur in nested hierarchies and the descriptions of mechanisms in neuro-
biology and molecular biology are frequently multi-level.’ Again, the decomposition is
constrained: the entities and activities sought are those responsible for the phenomenon.
Take Glennan’s favourite example of a toilet. We can explain the flushing of the
toilet mechanistically. The edge of the handle, and a part of the water are pieces of the
mechanism of the toilet, but not components. They don’t each have a function that
contributes to the functioning of the toilet, so altering them won’t have a recognisable
effect on the functioning of the toilet. But the handle itself and the ballcock and valve are
components performing specific functions—including triggering, and regulating water
flow. Thus, changing one of these will affect the operation of the toilet in a recognisable
way. They are component entities and activities. (See Illari and Williamson (2010) for
detailed discussion of the importance of function with reference to the mechanisms
of protein synthesis and natural selection.) Organization also exists in the toilet. The
cistern must be appropriately positioned relative to the bowl, and the pulling of the lever
will occur before the flushing of the water. Hierarchy is also present. Presumably, at a
lower level the materials that the ballcock and valve are composed of will explain their
functioning. For example, the material and construction of the ballcock explains why it
floats, so responding to the level of water. The mechanistic explanation can descend one
level.
RBNs. Our aim is to use RBNs to describe mechanisms of this and more complex
kinds: entities and activities organized to be responsible for a phenomenon, often
hierarchically. Broadly, we envisage nodes in the RBN standing for variables describing
either entities or activities. In our cancer example, variableG describes an entity—whether
the p53 gene is wild or mutant. VariablesP andE measure activities—the rising or falling
levels of protein p53 or caspase 3, respectively. Arrows in the RBN, however, will stand
only for activities—interactions and influences among the variables. This is because the
structure of the arrows in the RBN will represent aspects of the causal organization of
the mechanism. Arrows in our cancer example represent, for instance, the influence of
familial factors on the patient in question, and the influence of the level of protein p53
in triggering Apaf1 level, and caspase 8 level, which trigger the caspase cascade leading
to apoptosis.
RBNs are flexible enough to do this because they use variables, which can represent
many things. The interesting question for RBNs concerns the network variables. These
are the most constrained since they have to represent the kind of thing that can be
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related causally to other (same-level) nodes in the model, and constitutively to other (higher-
or lower-level) nodes in the model. Our network variable is node C , standing for
DNA condition. Node C represents something causally related to age, familial factors,
and survival time; and constitutively related to what is represented by the lower-level
nodes D,G,P,O,E, T and I—the mechanism responsible for DNA condition. This
requires some attention, since on the one hand causes conventionally (although not
uncontroversially) relate distinct events. On the other hand, mechanisms relate entities
and activities and their organization to the explanandum phenomenon they constitute.
Happily, this is no bar to the success of the model. Network variables will have to
represent only activities or phenomena that are susceptible to constitutive mechanistic
explanations. The activity represented by a particular network variable will be the charac-
teristic activity produced by the lower-level mechanism or mechanisms described in the
lower-level nets that are the possible assignments to that variable. In our cancer example,
the relevant phenomenon is DNA condition, and the lower-level nets model the mech-
anisms responsible for correctly functioning apoptosis, yielding good DNA condition,
and incorrectly functioning apoptosis, yielding bad DNA condition. In this way, the
lower-level BNs describe the mechanisms responsible for the changes in the higher-level
variable describing the activity of the mechanisms. Clearly, some nodes will not have a
decomposition, since they will not be the kinds of things likely to have a mechanistic
explanation. Age, for example, seems unlikely to have a lower-level mechanism. In our
RBN, such nodes are simple variables.
The arrows to and from nodes describe relations between the activities produced
by the lower-level mechanisms, and variables describing other (same-level) entities and
activities in the RBN. In our case, increased age causes worse DNA condition, and worse
DNA condition reduces likely survival time. These are modelled by (same-level) arrows
in the RBN. Both higher-level and lower-level networks are directed acyclic graphs and
so represent causal structures. In so far as they are useful, it will be because they represent
something about the causal organization of the mechanisms they describe. The unified
model, modelling both causal and constitutive relations, offers valuable insights into the
relationships between higher-level clinical variables known to be relevant to survival and
lower-level indicators of DNA damage.
Formal modelling assumptions. We move now to consider the formal modelling
assumptions that RBNs must satisfy. It is worth clarifying exactly what claim we defend:
we claim that the RBN formalism we have presented can usefully represent some mecha-
nisms. We are not claiming that all RBNs can be interpreted mechanistically, for reasons
that will become clear. Nor are we claiming that all mechanisms can be represented using
an RBN. There are well-known modelling assumptions required for BNs to be applied,
and RBNs inherit these. Where the following modelling assumptions are violated, there
is no guarantee that RBNs will be useful for modelling mechanisms:13
13 We do not include stability, faithfulness or minimality assumptions. These assumptions are normally
invoked to justify procedures for learning causal networks from data. Since we assume causal relations
are given for the purposes of this paper, they are unnecessary.
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• Causal Markov Condition: At each level, each variable is independent of its non-
effects, conditional on its direct causes.
• Modularity: At each level, an intervention to change the value of a variable does
not change the underlying causal structure. It merely breaks the arrow between
the altered variable and its parents.
• Acyclicity: The system does not involve any feedback loops.
We have added a new assumption, and there is no guarantee that RBNs will be useful
where it is violated:
• Recursive Markov Condition: Each variable is probabilistically independent of
those variables that are neither its inferiors nor peers, conditional on its direct
superiors.
As explained in §2., the Recursive Markov Condition and Causal Markov Condition are
integrated via the Recursive Causal Markov Condition.
The first three assumptions have been thoroughly discussed and are well-understood
(see, e.g., Williamson 2005; Cartwright 2007, Part II). There are established strategies
for building models that do not violate the Causal Markov Condition or acyclicity (Pearl
1988; Neapolitan 1990; Spirtes et al. 1993; Neapolitan 2004). Problematic cases for
modularity are well-known, such as in the social sciences: for example see the discussion
of ‘structure altering interventions’ in Steel (2008). We will not discuss these further
here. It is sufficient to note that both levels of our cancer RBN separately meet the
modelling assumptions of traditional BNs. In particular, the lower-level networks do
not include cycles. This is why the Mdm2-p53 negative feedback loop, and the complex
intermediate steps of the caspase cascade, which involves positive feedback loops, have
each been summarised in a standard way with a single causal arrow. Summarising in this
way ensures that the relationships represented in each BN do satisfy these modelling
constraints.14
The Recursive Causal Markov Condition, however, is new, and it is worth examining
whether every mechanism will satisfy it. Looking again at our cancer example, repre-
sented in Figure 2, the network variable is node C—DNA condition. The lower-level
14 In general, handling causal cycles in the right way is of crucial importance for BNs to deliver good
predictions under intervention. (Since an RBN is a special kind of BN, the issue of cyclicity is not a
distinct, extra problem.) For this purpose, one among the following strategies is commonly employed.
One strategy consists in time indexing the variables, which is commonly done when using dynamic
BNs (DBNs). For DBNs, it is possible that one variable causes another and vice versa—but at different
times. DBNs are also useful for inferring the time that elapses between cause and effect. For these
reasons, they are often used to model biological mechanisms such as gene expression networks. (For
more on DBNs and their biological applications, see, e.g., Friedman et al. (1998, 2000).) However,
since the temporal aspect is orthogonal to our primary concern, which is modelling hierarchy, it will
not be dealt with here. Another strategy consists in combining the values (e.g., a1, a2, b1, b2) of two
variables (A andB) that are connected by a causal loop, into a single variable (AB, taking the possible
values a1b1, a1b2, a2b1, a2b2). Finally, one can leave out a node if one is not interested in it, provided
the node in question is not a common cause of other variables in the net—in the present case, a
suitable move is simply to leave out Mdm2. Notice that these strategies do not involve making false
assumptions about known cycles, but are instead formal moves to deal with them in a principled way.
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nets are represented in Figure 3—correctly-functioning apoptosis—and Figure 4—
incorrectly-functioning apoptosis. For this net, the Recursive Causal Markov Condition
requires that, conditional on C , all the lower-level variables, D,G,P,O,E, T and I ,
are probabilistically independent of the other higher-level variables, A,F and S. The
condition can be informally linked with Craver’s mutual manipulability criterion for be-
ing a component in a mechanism. If D,G,P,O,E, T and I represent components in
the mechanism for C , wigglingD,G,P,O,E, T and I should affect C , and vice versa.
However, if the value of C is held fixed, wiggling any of the higher-level variables A,F
and S should have no effect on any of the lower-level variables D,G,P,O,E, T and
I , and vice-versa.
There are two possible problems for the Recursive Causal Markov Condition, which
are separate. The first problem is the existence of systems such that no possible RBN
(satisfying the Recursive Causal Markov Condition) could model such a system. An
infringement of the condition might be due to a failure of the Causal Markov Condition:
for instance, any system where there are two peers that are dependent but not causally
connected will create this problem. For example, the flow of the water in the toilet and
the sound of the water are dependent, but might not be viewed as causally connected
because they do not correspond to spatio-temporally distinct events. (Each seems to be
the kind of thing that has a mechanistic explanation at the lower level, and of course the
mechanistic explanation of the flow of water in the toilet will at the very least overlap
considerably with the mechanistic explanation of the sound of the water.)
The second problem concerns the usefulness of RBNs for modelling some systems.
The kind of system that might create difficulties (although note that it may not count as
a mechanism) is a system that is richly integrated so that many of the higher-level variables
are related to many of the lower-level variables, and vice-versa. RBNs representing such
systems may have to be so complex in order to satisfy the Recursive Causal Markov
Condition, as to be not much practical use. RBNs are designed to be useful for modelling
systems where a subset of the lower-level variables can be selected such that they act on
the higher-level net only via a subset of the higher-level variables (or a single higher-level
variable as in our cancer example). Selecting such a subset may be difficult for some
systems.
Consider for example a thermodynamic explanation for the temperature and velocity
of a body of air. These two aggregate variables are often related. We have an explanation
for the aggregate variable temperature in terms of (among other things) the kinetic energy
of the individual molecules. We have an explanation for the aggregate velocity of the
body in terms of (among other things) the velocity of each individual molecule. Perhaps
we could produce an RBN that included causal relations between the temperature and
aggregate velocity of the body, which would both be network variables, with lower-
level nets representing the molecular explanation. However, the kinetic energy of a
molecule is not independent (causally or probabilistically) of its velocity, so temperature
is not independent of the velocity of individual molecules, and aggregate velocity is
not independent of the kinetic energy of individual molecules. This is not just because
velocity and kinetic energy measure aspects of the same molecule, but because of the
meanings of ‘kinetic energy’ and ‘velocity’.
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Such a system can still be modelled using an RBN that satisfies the Recursive Causal
Markov Condition. For the above case, this can be achieved by making temperature also
a direct superior of the variables describing the average velocity of individual molecules,
and making aggregate velocity also a direct superior of the variables describing the
kinetic energy of individual molecules. Whether this is a model of a mechanism or not
depends on whether the superior-inferior relationships have a legitimate interpretation as
representing mechanistic hierarchy, as well as the original superior-inferior relationships
between temperature and kinetic energy and between aggregate and individual velocity.
Either way, this move already makes the RBN messier than we originally wanted. It can
be seen that putting further pressure on this example could lead to an RBNwhere all the
higher-level variables describing the body of air are direct superiors of all the lower-level
variables describing aspects of the individual molecules. The Recursive Causal Markov
Condition is trivially satisfied in such a net, but this is certainly not the kind of model that
would be particularly useful to build. In such a case—and of course if this kind of system
counts as a mechanism—then the RBN formalism may be less useful for modelling this
mechanism than some of the other formalisms we discuss in the next section.
The advantages of such a representation. By contrast, though, this kind of difficult
case highlights situations where the RBN formalism is instead likely to be useful. This
happens precisely when lower-level components responsible for particular features of
the higher level can be identified. Take a machine we have built, such as Glennan’s toilet.
We have constructed a ballcock and valve to refill the cistern after each flush. It is this
system that is responsible for the level of water in the cistern. It is not directly responsible
for anything else. We can be confident that the ballcock and valve acts on the flushing of
the toilet—say, the flow of water through the toilet bowl—only by being the component
that determines the level of water in the cistern. If we hold the level of water in the
cistern (the value of the higher-level network variable) fixed, the action of the ballcock
and valve is independent of the flow of water through the toilet bowl.
With the idea clear, we can return to our cancer example. This is not as simple as
the toilet. Cancer is a complex phenomenon, with many more interacting causes than a
toilet has. There are two possible problems. The first is that of many unknown causes.
This is clearly a practical concern when modelling cancer systems. However, we are
here assuming complete causal knowledge. This simplifies things. If we have complete
causal knowledge—if we know all the causal paths from D,G,P,O,E, T and I—we
will be in a position to know that they only affect or are affected by the higher-level
variables via C . (As we have said, for the purposes of this paper we are setting aside the
question of how RBNs might be useful in the absence of complete causal knowledge—
in the process of mechanism discovery.) The second problem is whether it is plausible
that a lower-level component can be identified that is responsible for the higher-level
clinical variable. Since DNA condition can be measured independently of the states of
D,G,P,O,E, T and I , it is a legitimate clinical variable. DNA damage and the cell’s
response is absolutely central to the development, treatment and survival of cancer; it
has been extensively studied, and in the construction of this example we draw on a
wide consensus that these are some of the lower-level mechanisms responsible for DNA
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condition. While of course a great deal is still unknown about cancer, we choose DNA
damage response—one of the most intensively studied features of cancer, generating
vast amounts of data—because we know enough about these mechanisms to make
modelling them using RBNs a plausible strategy, and one that is likely to be useful.
Sowe believe both that theRecursiveCausalMarkovConditionwill be satisfied in this
case, and that our model showing the effect of the lower-level variablesD,G,P,O,E, T
and I in terms of a single recursive variable describing DNA condition will be fruitful.
If the Causal Markov Condition is also satisfied in each net, then the Recursive Causal
Markov Condition will be satisfied. The RBN formalism will be applicable, and useful.
There are various general advantages of representing mechanisms in this way. Here,
we discuss three.
The first advantage is that this gives a quantitative description of a mechanism. If our
intention were to replace the more usual qualitative description of a mechanism in words
and diagrams with an RBN, there would be both losses and gains. Information from the
qualitative description would be lost. Most activities are represented in the same ways
using arrows in RBNs, so that richer descriptions of, for example, ‘pushing’ as different
from ‘pulling’ would be lost. But our intention is not to replace the descriptions of the
biological literature, so the richness of these descriptions is retained. There is only a gain:
in the precision and subtleties of quantitative relationships that can now be represented.
The two representations put together—diagrams plus RBN—are far more powerful than
either alone. A flat BN might be useful for these purposes, but a hierarchical RBN will
do more. In the next section we discuss other quantitative models which might be used
to model mechanisms, and explain the advantages of RBNs.
The second advantage lies in the consistency of the story about explanation, pre-
diction and control that the RBN framework adds to traditional ways of describing
mechanisms. The RBN framework enforces consistency. BNs are designed to represent
causal relationships and allow prediction and intervention. The RBN formalism extends
that to allow intervention and prediction across levels—using precisely those hierarchical
relationships that are discovered when mechanisms are investigated. For more complex
mechanisms, even the explanatory story given in traditional qualitative descriptions is
enhanced by getting these quantitative relationships right. It is increasingly vital in, for ex-
ample, both proteomics and genomics to represent very precisely not just what proteins
are produced, or genes expressed, but exactly what levels and over what time periods.
The third advantage of RBNs is economy. A single RBN encapsulates many BNs.
This economy of representation matters, allowing the relationships between the BNs
to be represented in a more readily understandable and cognitively manipulable way.
Formally equivalent mathematical formalisms are not equal in their representational
usefulness, and this economy of representation might lead to fruitful progress.
In sum, RBNs are useful for representing mechanisms as they are discussed in
the complex-systems mechanisms literature. There are several benefits to representing
mechanisms this way.
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5. Alternative models for prediction, explanation and control
In this section we further argue for the suitability of the RBN formalism by comparing
it with alternative models. Recall, the reason why we opted for Recursive Bayesian Nets
was that they satisfy three desiderata:
1. to model causal relations, so that the model can be useful for causal explanation
and for control,
2. to model hierarchical mechanisms, so that the model can be useful for mechanistic
explanation, and
3. to model probabilistic relations, so that the model can give accurate quantitative
predictions.
Alternativemodels, notably differential equations, agent-basedmodels andmultilevel
models, certainly perform pretty well in providing quantitative information, as they all
go beyond mere qualitative description of phenomena. They look like good potential
candidates for our purposes—and consequently like competitors to RBNs—because
they are intended to model hierarchies or they can easily be adjusted and interpreted in
order to do so. Yet, as we shall show, they all have trouble with at least one of the other
two desiderata.
Differential equations. Much can be learnt from a comparison with differential
equations. This formalism has been developed in order to model complex systems, and
in particular their dynamics, that is how they evolve over time. System analysis (see
for instance Bunge (2000, 1979), Simon (1969), von Bertalanffy (1968)) exploits this
formalism because the mathematics of differential equations allows the scientists to
include in the model a large number of variables at a time, as well as their relations,
including back-and-forth interactions between variables.
But system analysis has trouble modelling the kind of mechanisms we are interested
in. This is because, in differential equations, variables have no explicit causal role because
such equations do not on their own capture any causal asymmetry. Nor is there a natural
mechanistic interpretation of differential equations (on this point see, e.g., Russo (2010)).
Granted, some differential equations might be interpreted as modelling hierarchies—in
principle nothing prevents the inclusion of variables at different levels—but we need
mechanistic hierarchy. Decomposing and describing the mechanisms in terms of entities
and activities makes the model specifically mechanistic in that it provides details about the
functioning and about the relations between the parts.
Agent-basedmodels. Another type ofmodel that is increasingly receiving attention in
the scientific community is the agent-based model. Agent-based models are computational
models that aim to simulate behaviour of individual agents in a system. The goal is,
ultimately, to assess the effects of individual agents on the system as a whole. In particular,
agent-based models aim to reproduce emergent behaviour from micro- to macro-level.
There has been growing interest in, and more and more applications of, agent-based
models since the mid-1990s, especially in business and technology problems. More
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recently, there have been attempts to model cellular behaviour in cancer science (see
for instance Chen and Hardoon (2010), Chen (2009)). Agent-based models attempt
to reproduce the behaviour of individual agents such that the behaviour will give rise
to emergent properties/behaviours at a higher level of organisation, thus implying
that the system as a whole is more than the sum of its individual components. But
this methodology has some well-known limitations, restricting its use for prediction,
explanation and control.
First, since simulation is used to derive the relevant emergent properties, it is typical
that so many simplifying assumptions need to be made that it is implausible that the
resulting model is an accurate enough model of a complex system for it to make reliable
quantitative predictions. Second, the direction of explanation is rather limited: agent-based
models attempt to simulate behaviour that emerges from the lower level to the higher
level, but not the other way round. The lower level is always taken to be at the individual
level, and the resulting emergent behaviour to be at a higher, aggregate level. So only
two levels are involved and the direction of explanation is always bottom-up. Third, the
direction of control is similarly restricted: an agent-based model tells one how to control
the emergent phenomenon by changing the parameters or constraints operating on the
individuals, but that is the only kind of control question that the model can help answer.
One advantage of agent-based models is that they may be able to capture spatial
aspects of phenomena—in our case the spatio-temporal evolution of tumours. RBNs,
admittedly, are not able to do this. Yet, RBNs are not meant to be the only model
for explanation, prediction or control. RBNs are meant to augment, rather than replace,
pictorial representations of tumour development, which can capture spatial information.
Multilevelmodels. Themost interesting comparison is perhaps withmultilevel models.
The reason is that the primary motivation for developing this formalism was exactly the
recognition of a hierarchical structure of systems in virtually all domains.
Multilevel models are an extension of structural equation models (and therefore, in
a loose sense, of Bayesian nets too, since Bayesian net models and structural equation
models are very similar) that allow one to formalise the following idea: systems, par-
ticularly social systems (where this formalism was first developed and applied) have a
hierarchical structure. Multilevel analysis posits that society is essentially hierarchically
organised (see Courgeau (2003, 2007), Goldstein (2003), Snijders and Bosker (2004)). In
the social sciences, various levels of aggregation are possible. For instance, economics
is interested in the production, distribution and consumption of wealth; however, there
is no a priori restriction on whether analyses concern individuals, markets, firms, or
nations. Likewise, demography has no a priori restriction to the level of family, local
population, or national population. Multilevel analysis recognises the existence of a mul-
tiplicity of levels and tries to specify the relations holding among individuals and/or
among different levels of aggregation. The underlying idea is that there is a reciprocal
influence of the individual on the group and of the group on the individual. While
traditional statistical methods use different models to analyse data at the individual or
aggregate level, multilevel models permit the analysis of such hierarchical structures in
the framework of a single statistical model. Failing to recognise the hierarchical structure
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of social systems leads to incorrect identification of causal relationships and even to the
well-known ecological and atomistic fallacies (Robinson 1950).
Multilevel models were first developed in the social sciences. Here is an example
of the kind of phenomena social scientists wanted to model. A pioneering case study
concerns migration behaviour in Norway (Courgeau (1994, 2003)), where multilevel
models were used to explain migration rates of farmers. Multilevel modelling offered a
successful explanation of a phenomenon in which an individual-level model and separate
aggregate model delivered apparently opposite results. On the one hand, an individual-
level model explains individual-level outcomes by individual-level explanatory variables.
For instance, in this model we can represent the probability of an individual migrating
conditional on the individual characteristic of being/not being a farmer. On the other
hand, the aggregate model explains aggregate-level outcomes through aggregate-level
variables. For instance, we explain the percentage of migrants in a region through the
percentage of people in the population having a certain occupational status (e.g., the
percentage of farmers). Multilevel models make claims across the levels—from the
aggregate-level to the individual-level and vice versa; that is, the multilevel model of
migration in Norway explains the probability of migration of a non-farmer (individual)
through the percentage of farmers in the same region (aggregate): in the Norwegian
countryside farmers have a low chance of migration, but, as the percentage of farmers
increases, they will start to migrate more thus raising the overall probability of migration
in the whole population. In other words, the multilevel model allows the proportion of
farmers in the population to be a cause of a particular farmer migrating.
Multilevel models go some way toward satisfying the three desiderata we identified:
they model probabilistic and causal relations, and they model hierarchical systems. How-
ever, multilevel models were not devised to model mechanisms. Now, arguably, causal
models in social science, which do include multilevel models, ought to be used to model
mechanisms insofar as they aim to explain a phenomenon, since the explanatory job is
carried out by the mechanism being modelled (Russo 2009, ch. 6). Nevertheless, it seems
that in cancer science multilevel models are rather used to reconcile results between
various levels of aggregation (see e.g., Delsanto et al. (2008)), or to check distribution of
disease (see e.g., Short et al. (2002)), but not to model mechanisms that are hierarchical
in themselves. In other words, multilevel models are used as means to avoid ecological
and atomistic fallacies in drawing causal conclusions from analyses that use data at only
one level, and the statistical machinery of multilevel models is not ipso facto a legitimate
representation of a hierarchical mechanism.
It is also important to bear in mind that multilevel models can model hierarchical
structures, but only to a limited extent. In fact, the present state of the art is that multilevel
models cannot put aggregate variables as response variables, while RBNs can. Simply put,
this means that, at present, this formalism models how individual-level variables (plus,
if needed, aggregate variables) have an influence on aggregate variables.
In sum, RBNs suit our goals because they can account, in a single modelling frame-
work, for the three aspects we took to be essential: modelling causal relations, modelling
probabilistic relations, and modelling mechanistic hierarchies. RBNs proved to be more
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suitable than BNs for our purposes because they are hierarchical. RBNs are better suited
to modelling hierarchical mechanisms than system analysis because they can capture
causal connections. RBNs have wider scope than agent-based models which just capture
mechanisms involving multi-agent interactions. Finally, RBNs have the advantage of
modelling mechanistic constitution relations rather than levels of aggregation, unlike
multilevel analysis.
6. Conclusion
The need for quantitative models of hierarchical mechanisms is recognised by biological
scientists when they make such claims as:
The best test of our understanding of cells will be to make quantitative
predictions about their behaviour and test them. This will require detailed
simulations of the biochemical processes taking place within the modules.
But making predictions is not synonymous with understanding. We need
to develop simplifying, higher-level models and find general principles that
will allow us to grasp and manipulate the functions of biological modules. ...
Connecting different levels of analysis—frommolecules, through modules,
to organisms—is essential for an understanding of biology that will satisfy
human curiosity. (Hartwell et al. 1999, C52)
This paper has been an attempt to fill this need by introducing the recursive Bayesian
network (RBN) formalism and applying it to the modelling of mechanisms. The RBN
formalism, we maintain, provides an integrated modelling formalism for explanation,
prediction and control. The formalism can be applied to modelling cancer mechanisms,
where hierarchy is ubiquitous and vast amounts of data are increasingly available. This
kind of model also shows how the current philosophical conception of a mechanism can
be further developed, by integrating a quantitative description of the interaction between
variables with the philosophically more familiar structural description of hierarchical
relations between activities and entities. It is prima facie preferable to other kinds of
models used in this context, such as agent-based models, differential-equation models,
and multilevel models.
But there is much more to do before this kind of model can be routinely applied.
First, formal work is needed to develop efficient methods for performing inference in
an RBN. While standard Bayesian net methods for inference can be applied to RBNs,
there is an added computational consideration for RBNs arising from the multiplicity
of flattenings—for a single RBN there are 2k flattenings, assuming k binary network
variables—and work needs to be done to ensure that this extra complexity can be kept
under control. Second, it would be helpful to develop the cancer application more fully,
in particular on real data, to test the RBN formalism and validate the model. Third,
the question of how to build RBNs in the face of incomplete mechanistic, causal and
probabilistic knowledge needs thorough investigation. Known causal structure can be
imposed on data to help make sense of the remaining relationships, and there are existing
methods for doing this using BNs. The RBN formalism offers a parallel way of imposing
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known structure on data—by appealing to hierarchical structure, information which is
currently normally thrown away. One interesting issue is whether mechanisms currently
represented using newly-born representations such as the Systems Biology Graphical
Notation (Novere et al. 2009) can be automatically translated into RBN hierarchical
structure.
A satisfactory answer to this third question would open up the use of RBNs for
mechanism discovery. By treating hierarchical structure in a formally equivalent way to
causal structure, this formalism might allow us to extend known methods for extracting
unknown causal structure from data to extracting unknown hierarchical structure. This
is an exciting possibility for studying cancer, where both causal and hierarchical structure
are still to be discovered in the areas opened up by new technology in the last decade.
But it is also of relevance to any field in which there is a great deal still to be found
about both causal and hierarchical structure, and yet plenty of data available, such as in
proteomics and genomics.
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